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Reorganization of the Ombudsman model in 
Kosovo 
 




The advancement of the Ombudsman‘s work directly affects 
the strengthening of the rule of law. Every administration  
undergoing transition as is the case in Kosovo must increase 
its efficiency in meeting the rule of law standards. The 
edifice of mechanisms controlling the powers does not 
suffice if they are not attended by functional and efficient 
pratices, whichfrom time to time and when needed, are 
examined and analyzed, both in structure and in terms of 
the results they give. Therefore, this is the motivation and 
main purpose of the analysis at hand, which takes into 
consideration the normative content, comparing it with 
other countries in the region and beyond. The current model 
belongs to the ―emergency‖ phase before the era of 
independence when its role was left in the second plan, 
while it has much more importance in controlling the work 
of public administration bodies. In addition, the 
Ombudsman is still not sufficiently respected in public 
administration, and has a limited scope in society mainly 
due to lack of competence. From the examination it will 
appear that the role of the Ombudsman will increase by 
shifting from the current monocratic model to the collegial 
model in order to expand the scope of activity and increase 
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the competencies. This will influence his recommendations 
to be taken into account more by those segments of the 
administration that make concessions or violations of 
legality. Recommendations should be legally binding. 
 
Keywords: Ombudsman, organizational models, competencies, 
public administration, human rights. 
 
Meeting the standards for the rule of law from 
Kosovo's state institutions on the road to successful state 
building necessarily requires the strengthening of the role of 
independent power control mechanisms. In this regard, the 
Ombudsman plays an important role, provided that he is 
more respected by other public administration bodies to 
which he is addressed in case of violations. 
The purpose of this work is based on this need and 
benefits the functioning and increase of the efficiency of the 
Ombudsman as an independent body of control over public 
administration and human rights protection in Kosovo. The 
paper focuses on trying to answer the issue of extending the 
scope of this mechanism. The implementation of new models 
imposes additional competencies for specific areas, which so 
far have not been discussed. Remodeling necessarily 
requires a new normative approach and consequently 
constitutional and legal changes. 
The administration is aware of its duties and 
obligations under the constitution and the law, but it often 
happens that these obligations are not respected in practice. 
Therefore, the idea of the existence of a mechanism such as 
the Ombudsman, whose responsibility has always been to 
prevent and independently correct the administration. The 
paper's focus is on model analysis that could be 
recommended to be implemented in Kosovo by comparing 
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successful experiences from other countries as well as 
scientific research by various authors. 
The paper relies on qualitative methods the legal 
contents in a comparative context are compared with those 
at the regional and partly European level. The models that 
are being considered have been successfully implemented by 
different European countries, departing from Nordic 
countries of the origin of this mechanism. Finally, the 
synthesized results of what have been reviewed are given, 
and recommendations for the new organizational model and 
additional competencies for the institution of the 
Ombudsman in Kosovo. 
The paper analyzes opportunities to increase the role 
of the Ombudsman in Kosovo through the re-organization of 
the current model and competences. For this purpose, a brief 
overview of the origin of this mechanism is provided, and 
the various models referred to by scientists and state 
legislation. 
 
Origin, dissemination and definition of the 
Ombudsman Institutions 
 
The first signs of the existence of institutions similar to the 
Ombudsman lie deep in history and early civilizations. In 
the electronic Sensagen Dictionary, the article titled Origins 
and etymology of Ombudsman, it is said that in Ancient 
China, in the Huan Dynasty an institution called Juan (221, 
B.C) was created tasked with controlling the abuses of 
officials with power. As stated in the Electronic 
Encyclopaedia Antique History, in the article Tribuni Plebis 
in ancient Rome, tribunes played the role of lawyers of the 
people. They were responsible, among other competencies, 
for citizen complaints against power abusers. In the Arab 
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Caliphate, according to the Conference Report The Network of 
Ombudsman in the Member States of the Islamic Cooperation 
Organization (2014), this mechanism was called Judge of the 
Judges (in the original: Qadi-al-Qaddat), who was a powerful 
official with full financial and administrative autonomy able 
to investigate any and every action involving a state official 
in maladministration. According to this report, in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Sultan appointed a person named 
Mohtasib in order to control the conduct of imperial officials 
in the execution of his orders, protecting the remonstrants 
from violations. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the mechanism of 
the Ombudsman was installed in the Scandinavian 
countries. It did not take long for it to spread with great 
intensity in other countries in Europe. 
According to Herzog (2015) ―It was King Karl XII of 
Sweden … who in 1713 named a representative called the 
Hägsteombudsmännen to control government administration 
(p.185). 
The Swedish Ombudsman, who is the first of its kind 
in Europe, according to Herzog (2015), ―apparently 
originates from the inspiration of Swedish King Charles XII, 
from his time in Istanbul ... and after returning in Sweden, 
decided to have a similar office there‖ (p.185). 
It took a relatively long time until this institution 
began to spread to other places, followed by Finland in 1919. 
According to Kucsko-Stadlmayer (2008), ―it was Denmark 
that in 1954 initiated the popularity of this mechanism and 
created a new legal framework that became a very important 
model for future developments. But also Norway adopted 
such a legal structure in 1963‖ (p.1). Reif (2004) also points 
out that ―public sector ombudsman popularity grew in the 
1960s, as it was said, it was the version of the Danish and 
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Norwegian office embraced by other countries‖ (p.6). With 
regard to the European extension of the Ombudsman, the 
author Henk Addink (2005) distinguishes three stages of its 
extension: ―The first phase belongs to Sweden (1809) and 
Finland (1919), the second relates to Denmark (1954) and 
Norway 1962), while the third phase begins in the seventies 
and ends in the nineties of the last century‖ (p.271). 
The definition of the scope of work and the social 
causes that led to the formation of this mechanism have been 
formulated by some authors, among whom are Buck, 
Kirkham and Thompson (2011). These authors argue that 
―Large-scale bureaucracies created new opportunities for 
both arbitrary and incompetent exercise of power and, as a 
consequence, a growth in citizen complaints against the 
various emanations of the state‖ (p.10). Hedee (2000) adds in 
this respect that ―in much of the remainder of Europe, the 
reason for the adoption of the ombudsman institution has 
been more prosaic and has been linked to the growth of the 
administrative sector‖ (p.10).  
A more basic definition is given by author Frahm 
(2013), who states that ―although there is no universal 
definition since the birth of the Ombudsman Institution, 
however, there is a broad agreement that the Ombudsman is 
an institution that receives, investigates and reports 
complaints about the (or lack of) actions of the public 
administration‖ (p.4). For the same problem, the albanian 
author, Stavileci (2010), states that ―the Ombudsman is an 
institution of Swedish descent who understands the 
mediator or citizen's representative in relation to the 
administration in the protection of their rights; an institution 
of control over the work of the administration, with full 
independence, without any excessive formalism ...‖ (p.46). 
From another point of view, Roy and Philips (2000), despite 
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the differences in typology share a common vision of the 
features of the institution should include:  
 
―Investigating violations committed against any person or 
group of persons arising from decisions, recommendations 
or any other administrative act issued by an organ or public 
administration official; investigating complaints against the 
government or government officials, departments, and 
various public agencies; relevant recommendations, at the 
end of investigations on the administrative bodies that are 
within its jurisdiction; reporting of the legislative body to 
the results of its activity, as well as to any specific issue that 
could result in a wider interest‖ (p.3). 
 
Regarding the issue of defining the ombudsman, the 
author Sokoli (2010) emphasizes ―this mechanism, which in 
his genesis was determined to maintain the balance between 
the executive (see: the king) and the legislative‖ (p.147). In 
line with this, Vogiatzis (2018) contends that ―... the 
Ombudsman institutions in general have the potential to 
contribute to policy democratization, including more 
accessible policies, introducing opening and transparency, 
being a mediator between individuals and the 
administration and an instrument of democratic 
participation ― (p.58). Thus, it is a common thought among 
many authors that as a result of the rapid development of 
social relations, the state also grows. Resultantly, the legal 
relations and the bureaucracy may also increase the abuse of 
power. Hence, there was a need for additional mechanisms 
for dealing with complaints, such as the Ombudsman. 
Determining the scope of activity in some countries as a 
controller of the legality of administrative and human rights 
decisions and in others with jurisdiction over violations in 
the justice system or competencies in special areas, the scope 
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of these control mechanisms was mainly defined according 
to the political cultures of the specific countries but also 
depending on the stage of democratic development in which 
specific countries were located at the time when they formed 
these mechanisms. 
 
Ombudsman in the countries of the region and in 
Kosovo 
 
The Ombudsman in Albania is a constitutional body that 
operates based on the Law on Ombudsman no. 8454 of 
4.2.1999 and the internal regulations of his office. The 
Ombudsman has full jurisdiction at the national level. It was 
formed with the 1998 Constitution, since in 1995, Albania 
joined the Council of Europe, which warranted the existence 
of a mechanism for human rights protection. This was 
reflected in the 1998 Constitution (Articles 60-63). Under the 
constitutional authorizations, ―the Ombudsman protects the 
rights and legitimate interests of the individual from 
unlawful and irregular acts or inactions of the public 
administration bodies‖ (Article 60). In addition to these acts, 
its activity is based on the Code of Good Administrative 
Behavior, the Law on Consumer Protection, the Law on the 
Right to Information, the Law on Rights and Treatment of 
Prisoners and the Internal Rules of Work of his office. 
The Slovenian Ombudsman was preceded by the 
Council for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. The members of this Council were 
university professors, artists, journalists, priests and other 
specialists in the field of human rights. The Human Rights 
Ombudsman, based on Article 159 of the Constitution, took 
over the duties of this Council on the first of January 1995 
(Human Rights Ombudsman official web page, Slovenia). 
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According to the Slovenian Constitution of 1991 (Article 
159), ―with the aim of protecting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms in relation to the state authorities 
and local self-government, the holders of public 
authorizations, the office of the Ombudsman for Citizens' 
Rights will be established by law‖. Thus, the Law on the 
Slovenian Ombudsman No. 71/1993 was created, which sets 
out detailed provisions regarding the legal status, duties and 
competencies of the Ombudsman. According to the Law on 
Ombudsman No. 71/1993, the working criteria of the 
Slovenian Ombudsman are constitutional provisions and 
international legal acts on human rights. In addition to 
human rights, the Slovenian Ombudsman is in charge of and 
has legal jurisdiction over regimes in cases of 
mismanagement (Article 3). 
The roots of the Ombudsman Institution in Kosovo are 
not very profound. They relate to the time of the end of the 
war (1998) and the subsequent deployment of United 
Nations administration (hereafter: UN). For the first time in 
Kosovo, this administration founded the Ombudsman in 
2000 based on the Regulation no. 2000/38, after almost two 
centuries from the establishment of the first Swedish 
Ombudsman (1809). Peculiar in the case of Kosovo is that of 
its founder, i.e. the UN. According to Regulation 2000/36, 
this institution was designated as the Ombudsman 
Institution of Kosovo and was authoritatively appointed by 
the UN‘s Head of Mission. Later, in 2006, according to 
Regulation No. 2006/6, the Ombudsman was elected by the 
Assembly, democratizing his election and accountability, but 
still leaving behind the importance and power of the 
competences he should have. After the independence of the 
country (2008), circumstances changed for the benefit of the 
Ombudsman. Thereafter, its authorizations are based on the 
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Constitution and the Law on Ombudsman No. 05/L-019, 
2015. Although these documents include a wide range of 
fields, some of them are not included. According to these 
documents, the final acting mechanism of the Ombudsman 
is the Recommendation which should be applied by the 
bodies to which it is addressed. However, because of its 
inssuficent legal power, it can not force the parties to fully 
implement what is recommended. Consequently, the 
analysis carried out in this paper is focused on the 
remodeling and enhancement of competences, in the benefit 
of the efficiency of its controlling role, both for human rights 
and the legality of the public administration decisions. 
Regarding the competences, the Kosovo Ombudsman 
has the following powers: children's rights protection; 
protection of citizens from discrimination and promoting 
equality; the implementation of the role of the National 
Mechanism for Torture Prevention; the promotion of the 
protection of human rights; the performance of Amicus 
Curiae, and mediation and reconciliation. These 
competences are defined by the Constitution (Article 22). 
Against this scope, we note that its competences are deficient 
because they do not cover some important areas, both from 
the public and private sectors. 
 
Different models for the Ombudsman Institution 
 
Regardless of the typologies and competences it embodies, 
the role of anOmbudsman has generally been thought of as a 
mechanism for control purposes. Various countries around 
the world, in the region and in Kosovo, have created 
different models of the Ombudsman. These models have 
been based on the need to strengthen the rule of law through 
independent control over their administrative organs, 
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somewhat against judicial ones, by implementing this 
practice both in the public and often private sector (the latter 
lacking in Kosovo); in general; somewhere elected by the 
legislative and elsewhere by the executive, at the national or 
regional level; in the case of the European Union as a 
supranational level. Different authors have mentioned 
different models, implemented for different and even 
specific areas. This facilitates understanding the scope and 
role of these institutions. In reality, the purpose of this paper 
is to find an adequate and more efficient model to reflect on 
the organization of the Ombudsman in Kosovo. 
Hence, there are different models that apply across 
developed countries, which could serve as good and 
convenient practices to implement in the circumstances of 
Kosovo. Some of them referenced by the author Reif (2004), 
of interest to our review, are as follows: 
 
1) Executive Ombudsman created by government 
departments, agencies and public corporations to handle 
internal or external complaints: Established by a 
government department, agency or public corporation at the 
national or regional level of government; 2) The public and 
private sector hybrid ombudsman created by legislation on 
an industry or service sector to resolve customer complaints; 
3) Private sector self-created ombudsman (industry, 
services) for solving client-customer complaints;4) 
Organizational Ombudsman created by private sector 
institutions and corporations (p.26-28). 
 
Based on these models and in line with our point of 
view, it is of particular interest to cover the private sector as 
in some of its branches major violations have been observed 
thus far especially regarding issues of informality that as a 
consequence, result in a situation where complaints about 
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violations from employees can not appear in the courts 
although they may have far-reaching consequences for the 
lives of employees in this sector..In this regard, an 
Ombudsman covering the private sector would be 
considered a right and necessary solution. 
By classifying them according to their competencies 
Kucsko-Stadlmayer (2008) distinguishes three other models 
of the Ombudsman: ―the classic model, the hybrid model of 
human rights and the rule of law model‖ (p.61-62). The last 
missing model, the one on the rule of law, is of great interest 
to be implemented in the transitional circumstances that 
Kosovo is going through. Strengthening the rule of law is of 
vital interest both for the state building itself and for the 
country's aspirations in the Euro-integration processes. Thus, 
its weight surpasses the role of the human rights protection 
and the rule of law, more so when we consider a well-
respected statement by Stroink (2005), who characterizes the 
Ombudsman's institution as ―a mechanism which can play a 
balancing role between the three powers‖ (p.271). 
In comparison, unlike Kosovo, we can take the fact that 
from the regional countries discussed in this paper, the rule 
of law model is applied in Slovenia. Consequently, a proper 
analysis of the remodeling of the Ombudsman in Kosovo 
takes special attention. 
 
Reorganization of the Ombudsman model in Kosovo 
 
Referring to models in general, we can say that their review 
has helped us draw similarities and adaptability to Kosovo's 
needs and circumstances. The most typical and common 
feature in all the countries that were compared is the 
authority of the Ombudsman to provide recommendations 
regarding violations. In the Kosovo case there are legal 
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weaknesses in terms of its competences. From a legal point 
of view, they should be strengthened to ensure that beyond 
the authoritarian obedience or public pressure and charisma, 
the administration should be obliged to implement the 
recommendations of an Ombudsman. The lack of a legally 
binding character for his recommendations prevents the 
necessary and immediate implementation of these 
recommendations from the public administration bodies. 
obedience and public denunciation does not suffice. In this 
sense, we have many civil society organizations that can play 
this non-binding awareness-raising role, of which many exist 
in Kosovo. In this case, a legal norm is needed that binds the 
administration to legal sanctions in cases of offense. 
The Ombudsman‘s recommendations are acts that 
charge administration with certain tasks. In various 
doctrines, recommendations are considered as ―soft law‖ 
acts. Actually, the Ombudsman's recommendations exert 
their influence not through the typical attribute of power, 
which is t obligative to others, but through its authority, its 
arguments and public pressure. The recommendation 
instrument expresses the special character of the 
Ombudsman's function d without the norm of obligation, 
but through his power of persuasion. As such, what is the real 
legal force of these recommendations? The Ombudsman's 
decisions are similar to administrative acts, but are not 
authentic administrative acts. The main quality that 
differentiates between these is the sanction. The 
administrative act is an expression of the legal will, which 
also contains sanctions in case of non-enforcement, while the 
Ombudsman's recommendation does not have this element. 
On the other hand, his recommendations are an expression 
of administrative activity and legal will, but without binding 
force. These recommendations have a legal and 
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administrative contravention in themselves because they are 
sent for enforcement to another body, which itself is 
responsible for the violations that are evidenced in the given 
recommendation. So in this case, a voluntary self-
implementation of the administrative decision is required. 
However, no official body responsible for violations will 
sanction itself without being obliged to do so by another 
norm. 
For these reasons, in the future, the idea is to give the 
Ombudsman recommendations the power of sanctioned 
administrative acts. Theinvestigative procedure when 
initiating a case consists of three stages: initiation, 
proceeding and investigation. This lacks the last phase that 
exists in the proper procedure of an administrative act, i.e. 
sanctioning. Therefore, if the Ombudsman's decisions would 
have the power of a legally binding recommendation, results 
in controlling the  administration and citizen protection 
would be significantly greater. This is also based on the fact 
that the Ombudsman is a body of constitutional power and 
therefore its authority should be imposed on the bodiesover 
which it has jurisdiction control and which do not comply 
with the law. 
The model applied in Kosovo of an Ombudsman for all 
areas and cases, the hybrid or human rights model as it is 
otherwise called, is inadequate for a state that is undergoing 
democratic transition, as these societies are expected to have 
more violations and maladministration, and consequently a 
greater workload. In the Constitution of Kosovo (2008), it is 
stated: ―The Ombudsman oversees and protects the rights 
and freedoms of individuals from the illegal and improper 
actions or inactions of public authorities‖ (Article 132, point 
1). So, as seen, this mechanism only covers the public 
domain, but not the private shpere.  
Agron Xhemajli 
178     Thesis, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019     
The need for expanding the scope of activity also takes 
into account the number of violations referred by the 
Ombudsman. According to his report, the low level of 
compliance with the recommendations is only 31%, while 
78% of the violations that have been made by public 
authorities are stated in the Annual Report for 2017 (p.321). 
Based on these considerations, we recommend that the 
existing Ombudsman should be reorganized. The 
reorganization should include establishing a collegial body 
that will consist of Ombudsman for specialized areas that 
operate with competences in more than one field, currently 
extending the scope of the institution beyond the protection 
of human rights even in control of the legality of public 
administration acts as well as in the judiciary. The 
composing lawyers within this collegial body will do their 
work in interaction but independent of each other by being 
co-ordinated by a leading lawyer of the institution. This 
body can be referred to as the Council, the Institute, the 
Board, etc., as stated by Kucsko-Stadlmayer (2008) in 
Norway, called the ―Federal Ombudsman College‖ (p.450). 
By aiming for a more effective public administration in 
Kosovo that meets human rights standards and respects 
legality, it is obviously very important to implement a new 
form of organization for the Ombudsman.This should be 
done so that its activity covers all areas of social life in the 
function of independent control of the public and non-public 
administration. 
This way, some special models could be applied to the 
Ombudsman, such as the private sector that would cover 
and deal with the field of labor rights, social and pension 
affairs, the rights of employees in the private sector toward 
employers, the rights of unemployed and social cases; then 
for the missing persons; for children; for education; health 
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and the military. Other similar models could also be 
incorporated into this collegial body as the need and 
rationality that the legislative branch of power would foresee 
as necessary.  
An Ombudsman cannot have more success in all areas 
than a specific one for a particular field. In addition to the 
low level of compliance with its recommendations (31%), 
and the high rate of violations committed by public 
authorities (78%), arguments for this are the fact that court 
proceedings have proven to be not a fully effective 
mechanism, due to delays in procedures and higher financial 
costs incurred in court hearings. A major obstacle is the lack 
of implementation of the European Court of Human Rights 
practice, as argued by Martinez and Cuchi (2017). Finally, 
the other argument is the private sector involvement in the 
possibility of complaints against commercial and non-
commercial entities in cases of violation of administrative 
rights and procedures. In this regard, O'Brien and 
Seneviratne (2017) argue that ―the Ombudsman's treatment 
was traditionally reserved for public authorities, although 
the 1980s witnessed the appearance of the Ombudsman to 
investigate complaints against various private sector bodies‖ 
(p.10).  
Based on the data on the low impact of the 
recommendations, we suggest to extend the Ombudsman‘s 
powers so that he can force the administration to correct the 
abusive decisions, all this in benefit of strengthening the rule 
of law. This fact is reinforced by McMillan (2004) too, who 
argues that ―from the perspective of the rule of law, the 
handling of complaints by the Ombudsman strengthens the 
notion that the government is bound by rules and that there 
may be one independent assessment of compliance with the 
rules. The accountability of the government and the right to 
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complain go hand in hand ... Knowing the right can be an 
important sign if democracy and rule of law are being 
practiced‖ (p.7). 
As a preliminary conclusion, the role of the 
Ombudsman can not be successful if it is based solely on 
charisma, persuasive power (arguments) and the public 
pressure he exerts on public administration bodies. But this 
is also argued by the examples implemented by more 
developed democracies than Kosovo. There is scope for 
implementing some models that provide more rule of law 
and are more efficient in organizational terms, that is, they 
have the widest scope, and consequently the competence 
that guarantee the imposition of the Ombudsman‘s role. 
As a preliminary conclusion, we may note that the 
Ombudsman‘s role can not be successful if it is based solely 
on charisma, persuasive power (arguments) and the public 
pressure it exercises in the public administration bodies. But 
this requires additional competencies through an new and 
more effective organizational structure. In this effort we 
want to follow the examples that are applied in the most 
democratic countries. Our scope, in the case of Kosovo, is to 
implement the model for the Ombudsman, which provides 




The views on reorganizing the activity of the Ombudsman in 
Kosovo are motivated by the aim to increase the efficiency of 
public institutions in the rule of law, the overall social goal. 
Especially as the current form of organization is extensive 
and even bureaucratic relying on an ―emergency‖ model of 
UN administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), which has almost 
been a mere decoration in the political institution's mosaic, 
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where its importance was rather insignificant, it is vital to 
reconsider its role in Kosovo.  
Given the barriers from the past, and the arguments 
we analyzed for the functionalization of the work, we think 
that the conditions are met, and this is also required by the 
political processes of state building as well as the Euro-
Atlantic integration ones, henceforth implementing a more 
advanced model for the Ombudsman in Kosovo. Two 
elements that we recommend would have made it more 
effective in solving the cases that the jurisdiction is liable to. 
These are a) the reorganization of the institutional model 
with the aim of expanding the scope of activity, and b) the 
strengthening of competencies by making his 
recommendations legally binding. 
With regard to these two issues, without prejudice to 
the role of ―the fourth power‖ and without interfering in the 
balance of powers, the Ombudsman could be transformed, 
by means of a mechanism that stamps the time of emergency 
institutions, to a modern and efficient enforcement 
mechanism in accordance with the most advanced European 
and global standards. 
This is reflected in the overall review through a series 
of examples from both European and regional countries, 
which support the conclusion that the role of the 
Ombudsman in external control is of great importance for 
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